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This thesis will seek to explore the effect religion and culture has in the workplace. Given the 
diversity of South Africa and the existence of many cultures and religions co-existing, there 
are bound to be conflicts in our everyday lives and the workplace is no exception. The focus 
of this thesis is to determine how competing rights of employers and employees are balanced 
in the workplace.  
The courts have a critical role in performing a balancing act between an employee’s right to 
exercise or observe their culture and religion in the workplace against the commercial rights of 
the employer who seek to run their business in a manner that is efficient and professional. The 
dissertation in Chapter One is an introduction into the topic. Chapter two will look briefly at 
the historical development of religion and culture in South Africa. Chapter Three will explore 
the statutory protection offered for the right to freedom of religion and culture in the workplace 
and how these are implemented. The important and established principle of reasonable 
accommodation will be looked at in Chapter Four.  A determination into the international arena 
and comparative analysis will be made between South Africa and international jurisdictions in 
Chapter Five. The courts critical role in balancing competing rights are dealt with in Chapter 
Six. Chapter Seven will lastly provide concluding remarks and recommendations and will end 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
South Africa is a place where many diverse cultures and religions attempt to co-exist 
harmoniously. Like the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (the 
“Constitution”) states in its Preamble, “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our 
diversity”. The large number of religious denominations reflect the many origins of South 
Africa’s population. 1  The workplace is a microcosm of a broader society and the need to work 
results in employees and employers spending a significant amount of time together in the 
workplace.2  This inevitably results in an intermixing of religious beliefs and diversity.3 The 
harmonious working relationship between employer and employee can soon dissipate when an 
employee’s religious beliefs, cultural beliefs or outward manifestations conflict with an 
employers’ commercial interests. The employment sphere may therefore be required to bring 
about a working environment conducive to cultural and religious diversity in order to maintain 
harmony between employer and employee.  
 
The Constitution and various other pieces of legislation seek to regulate the diversity of 
individuals by prohibiting unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices particularly on the basis 
of religion, culture and race. It furthermore entrenches an individuals’ right to practice their 
religion or observe cultures freely and this extends to the workplace.  These rights, as will be 
explored in greater detail, are not absolute thus giving rise to certain limitations placed on an 
employees’ fundamental rights. The reason for the limitation on an employees’ fundamental 
rights, are often, the competing commercial interests of an employer.  An employers’ 
competing commercial interests will often present itself in the prescribing of a dress code or 
perhaps denying leave of absence to an employee on religious days to be observed by such 
employee. Employees’ may refuse to comply with certain rules which will be directly in 
contravention of their religion or may want to express their religious or cultural beliefs, in 
contravention of the employer’s rules or policies.4 The employers’ rules or policies are imposed 
in order to carry out their business in a professional, effective, coordinated and efficient 
manner.  
 
                                                          
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 103 of 1996. 
2  R Henrico ‘Religious discrimination in the South African Workplace: Regulated regimes and flexible 
adjudication’ (2016) 37 ILJ 847. 
3 Ibid.  




The question therefore is how are these competing rights balanced? How are the rights of 
employees to freely practice their religion balanced against the commercial interests of an 
employer?  How is an employer to balance and maintain disciplined and orderly conduct or 
create a professional, efficient and cohesive environment in the workplace whilst 
accommodating the employees’ right to practice their religion freely? To what extent can 
religious beliefs or practices be exercised in the workplace?   What is the concept of reasonable 
accommodation and to what extent should it be applied?  
 There is a need to explore how conflicts of this nature are dealt with. Given the amount of time 
employees’ spend at work and how intrinsic religion and culture is to an individuals’ autonomy, 
these conflicts are bound to constantly arise within the work environment. What is of particular 
importance is how the courts have dealt with these conflicts thus far and from this we can 






















CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICAS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
RELIGION AND CULTURE  
The right to freedom of religion has had a turbulent history and an intolerance towards religion 
has always been prevalent in society.5 Discriminatory behaviour against religious faiths in 
South Africa date far back. Despite the pressures, religion and culture remained and in time 
colonial courts were permitted to apply forms of customary law as long as it was not contrary 
to the ideologies of humanity. 6  
Systems of customary law were not applied uniformly and as a result the Native 
Administrations Act7 was enacted.8 The unfairness of the non-recognition of religion and 
culture as forming part of a South African legal system was corrected with the confirmation of 
the final Constitution.  The Constitution brought about a paradigm shift for religions in South 
Africa.9 Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Constitution highlights that it is the supreme law of South 
Africa.  Any conduct, policy or law contrary to the Constitution is invalid. The right to freedom 
of religion, belief and opinion contained in the Constitution was designed to bring about 
religious diversity.  
The prohibition of unfair discrimination, particularly in the workplace, is an extremely vast and 
crucial area of consideration in labour law.10 Discrimination is deeply rooted in South African 
history and in a society where racial inequality was a norm and discriminatory practices became 
a pervasive feature of employment relations also. Under the apartheid government, 
discrimination against employees were permitted and unfortunately, legally enforced. The law 
allowed employers to discriminate on various grounds.11   Gradually discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, race and colour were outlawed. Thereafter discrimination on these grounds 
were deemed unfair labour practices. After the introduction of the Constitution in 1994 
discrimination in the workplace was dealt with comprehensively. When the Labour Relations 
Act (the “LRA”) came into existence, residual unfair labour practices were defined to include 
“any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and an employee involving the unfair 
                                                          
5 G Van Der Schyff ‘The historical development of the right to freedom of religion’ (2004) 2 TSAR 259.  
6 Ibid 301. 
7 38 of 1927 (it should be noted that the Act was repealed).  
8 Van Der Schyff (see note 5 above) 302.  
9 P Coertzen ‘Constitution, charter and religions in South Africa’ (2014) 14 AHRLJ 126.  
10 D Du Toit ‘Protection against unfair discrimination in the workplace: Are the courts getting it right?’ (2007) 11 




discrimination, either directly or indirectly, against an employee on any arbitrary ground, including but 
not limited to, race sex, ethnic, religion etc”.  
The enactment of national legislation to prevent unfair discrimination then give rise to the 
enactment of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (the “EEA”) in which unfair 
discrimination in the workplace was dealt with in its own right. It was necessary and essential 
to eradicate unfair discrimination in the workplace to give effect to the principles envisaged in 
the Constitution and the LRA. 12 Section 6 of the EEA now embodies the objectives of the 


















                                                          
12 Ibid 68. 
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CHAPTER THREE: STATUTORY PROTECTION OF RIGHTS 
3.1. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
Human dignity, equality and the development of human rights are core values of South African 
democracy. 13 As was correctly emphasized in MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay14, 
when interpreting any right, the courts should do so in a way that promotes human dignity, 
equality and freedom.  
 
3.1.1. The right to freedom of religion and culture 
Section 15(1) of the Bill of Rights as contained in the Constitution15 enshrines the right to 
freedom of religion and culture.  S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg16 referred to the 
Canadian case of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd17 that defined freedom of religion as “the right to 
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and 
without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice 
or by teaching and dissemination”. 18 
This right entailed that an individual should not be forced to act contrary to their religious rights 
and beliefs. 19  
 
The right to religious freedom is an important one as it invokes the idea of self-worth which 
forms the foundation of human dignity. 20 Religious and cultural rights and practices are central 
to human dignity which in turn is central to equality. 21  Persons belonging to religious 
communities should be able to practice their culture and religion. They should be allowed to 
form, join or maintain religious associations as long as they are not inconsistent with what is 
contained Bill of Rights.22 Whilst Section 15 entrenches the right to religious freedom, Section 
30 and 31 does so with culture.  As explained in the case of Pillay23 the Constitution seems to 
separate the two concepts. Religion can be understood as beliefs that a person may possess 
                                                          
13  The Constitution Act 108 of 1996; Section 1(a); Chapter 1 ; M McGregor ‘Employees’ right to freedom of 
religion versus employers’ commercial interests : A balancing Act in favour of religious diversity : A decade of 
cases’ (2013) 25 SA MERC LJ 224. 
14 MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at 63. 
15 Act No. 108 of 1996.  
16 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC). 
17 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 1 SCR 295 (hereinafter referred to as the Drug Mart case). 
18 Lawrence supra note 16 at para 92.  
19 P De Vos ‘Freedom of religion v drug traffic control: The Rastafarian, the law, society and the right to smoke 
the “holy weed” (2001) 5 (1) Law, Democracy & Development 86. 
20 McGregor (note 13 above; 225).  
21 Pillay supra note 14 at 62.  
22 The Constitution Act 108 of 1996; Section 31.  
23 Pillay supra note 14 at 143-144. 
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irrespective of other peoples beliefs whilst culture can be seen as the rights of persons who 
belong to a religious community with other members of that community. 24 It is of paramount 
importance for there to be a degree of tolerance and accommodation if everyone is to enjoy the 
right to religious freedom. However in the context of the workplace the right to religious 
freedom often competes with and may even sometimes be outweighed by other rights. 25  
 
3.1.2. The right to equality 
The right to equality finds expression in Section 9 of the Constitution and sets out that 
“Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. Section 
9 (2) emphasizes and states that “equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms”. The succeeding sections explicitly proscribe unfair discrimination against anyone, 
directly or indirectly, on the grounds of, but not limited to, religion, conscience and belief. 26  
The right to equality and the adjunct right not to be unfairly discriminated against is regulated 
by national legislation. 27 
 
3.1.2.1.Formal and Substantive Equality  
There should be a distinction drawn between formal and substantive equality in that the former 
means likeness of treatment, treating individuals alike in similar circumstances whilst the latter 
necessitates that the law achieves equality of outcome even if there is inconsistency of 
treatment in order to achieve this objective. 28 
With formal equality, differences between groups and individuals on an economic and social 
level are not considered. With substantive equality, there is consideration of an individual or a 
groups social and economic circumstances when considering the right to equality in terms of 
the Constitution.29 
 
When considering the two concepts in light of principles and purposes coupled with the 
historical burden of inequality, a formal concept of equality risks disregarding the fundamental 
values of the Constitution whilst a substantive notion is supportive of such core constitutional 
                                                          
24 Ibid.   
25 McGregor (note 13 above; 226).  
26 The Constitution; Section 9 (3)- 9 (5).  
27  R Henrico ‘South African Constitutional and Legislative Framework on Equality: How effective is it in 
addressing religious discrimination in the workplace’ (2015) 36 (2) Obiter 275. 




values. 30 Section 9(2) makes it clear that in order to achieve equality, the substantive approach 
should be embraced. Substantive equality recognizes differences in a diverse society which 
requires accommodation. 31  
 
It appears that the Constitutional Court (the “CC”) has applied a substantive interpretation 
when considering the concept of equality.32 The substantive approach which provides for the 
accommodation of diversity should in turn be looked at in the context of the right to fair labour 
practices accorded to employer and employee alike. The substantive approach is therefore 
fundamental to the concept of equality in the workplace.33  
The right to equal treatment referred to in the Constitution is to be interpreted as an employees’ 
right not to be unfairly discriminated against by his or her employer, on the basis of religion as 
provided for in the EEA and the LRA.34  
 
3.1.3. The right to human dignity 
An inescapable component of equality is human dignity.35 Our Constitution provides that 
“everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected”. 36  Though 
the concept of human dignity has not been clearly defined, we know that to qualify for 
constitutional protection, human dignity requires us to acknowledge and value all members of 
society as diverse as they may be. 37 As was highlighted in the case of Pillay38 where a quote 
from the case of Ferreira v Levin NO and Others39 and Vryenhoek and Others v Powell No and 
Others40 was extracted, Ackerman J stated: “Human dignity has little value without freedom, for 
without freedom, personal development and fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, human 
                                                          
30 Ibid 214-5. 
31 Henrico (note 2 above; 851). 
32 S Gaibie ‘Employment Equity and Anti-Discrimination Law: The Employment Equity Act 12 years on’ (2011). 
32 ILJ 21; President of the Republic of SA & another v Hugo 1997(4) SA 1(CC) 41 at para 112 where the court 
stated “Although the long term goal of our constitutional order [the South African Constitution] is equal treatment, 
insisting upon equal treatment in established inequality may well result in the entrenchment of that inequality”. 
Also see National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para 
35.  
33 The Constitution Act 108 of 1996; Section 23(1); Henrico (note 2 above; 851). 
34 Henrico (note 27 above; 276). 
35 Henrico (note 2 above; 851). 
36 The Constitution Act 108 of 1996; Section 10.  
37 De Waal (note 28 above; 251).  
38 Pillay supra note 14 at para 63. 
39 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 
40 Vryenhoek and Others v Powell No and Others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
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dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are inseparably linked. To deny people 
their freedom is to deny them their dignity.” 41  
When considering discrimination disputes in the workplace based on religion, our courts may 
include an analysis on the impact unfair discrimination has on the complainants’ dignity. 42   
 
3.2. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
Section 23 of the Constitution sets out labour law provisions however these are strengthened 
by national legislation giving effect to those constitutional rights. 43 Section 23 (1) of the 
Constitution states that “everyone has the right to fair labour practices”. The intention of the 
enactment of the Constitution was to regulate how state power is exercised, whilst the 
enactment of statutes was to give effect to basic rights as contained in the Constitution.44  The 
EEA and LRA are the principal pieces of legislation in regulating unfair religious 
discrimination disputes in the workplace. There has been no code developed in the EEA or the 
LRA to deal with unfair discrimination. 45  
 
Employees alleging unfair discrimination must rely on the EEA. The EEA offers greater 
protection to employees when unfair discrimination is alleged as opposed to the basic right as 
contained in the Constitution46.  
When a workplace conflict arises and an employees’ right to religious freedom is infringed 
upon, the employees right should be enforced under legislation. If an employees right is capable 
of being enforced under legislation then the employee is precluded from relying directly on the 
Constitution. 47 Where a statute or the common law fails to protect a basic right, only then 
should the Constitution be relied upon. 48  
 
The first blanket prohibition of unfair discrimination was contained in the Interim 
Constitution.49 Discrimination in the workplace on any of the listed grounds were considered 
                                                          
41 Pillay supra note 14 at para 63. 
42 R Henrico ‘The role played by human dignity in religious-discrimination disputes’ (2014) 35(1) Obiter 25. 
43 De Waal (note 28 above; 474) ; The LRA;  section 1 (a). 
44 Du Toit (note 10 above; 68).  
45 Henrico (note 2 above; 851). 
46 Du Toit (note 10 above; 68). 
47 De Waal (note 28 above; 474). 
48 Du Toit (note 10 above; 68).  
49 Section 8 states that “no person shall be unfairly discriminated against on any ground including a number of 
listed grounds such as race sex and religion”.  
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as an unfair labour practice. Direct50  and indirect discrimination51  were prohibited in the 
Interim Constitution. 52 In the case of Hoffman v South African Airways53 the CC sought to 
interpret what unfair discrimination means. The LRA then sought to enact a prohibition of 
unfair discrimination similar to the one contained in the Constitution however applicable 
exclusively in the employment context. Thereafter in 1997 the EEA was enacted with defences 
of affirmative action and inherent requirements of a job comparable to those contained in the 
Constitution and the International Labour Organization Convention 111 (the “Convention 
111”). 54 An example of discrimination is where an employer implements practice or policies 
which would have the effect of negatively impacting on an employee’s religious freedom or 
belief. Where the employer then fails to reasonably accommodate the employees’ religious 
belief when applying the practice, this may constitute unfair discrimination.55  
 
3.2.1. Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
The EEA is the primary legal instrument regulating equality in the workplace.56 The EEA states 
that “no person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee in any 
employment policy or practice on one or more grounds of, including …religion, conscience, 
belief…culture”. 57 The EEA replaced the repealed item 2(1) (a) of Schedule 7 to the LRA.58 
In addition, the purpose of the enactment of the EEA was to give effect to the requirements of 
the Convention 111. 59  Article 1 of the Convention 111 defines discrimination as “any 
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, amongst other listed 
grounds which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in 
employment or occupation”. 
 
Section 2 of Convention 111 provides that “any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a 
particular job based on the inherent requirements shall not be deemed to be discrimination”.  
                                                          
50 Du Toits’ example of direct discrimination is the refusal to employ a person based on gender. 
51 Du Toits’ example of direct discrimination is giving fewer leave days to employees on fixed-term contracts 
where majority are woman.  
52 Du Toit (note 10 above; 68). 
53 Hoffman v South African Airways (2000)12 BLLR 1438 (CC). 
54 Du Toit (note 10 above; 68). 
55 R B Bernard ‘Reasonable Accommodation in the Workplace: To be or not to be?’ J (2014) 17(6) PELJ 2870. 
56 S Singlee, ‘Conscience Discrimination in the South African workplace’ (2014) 35 ILJ 1851; O Dupper and C 
Garbers ‘The prohibition of unfair discrimination and the pursuit of affirmative action in the South African 
Workplace’ Reinventing Labour Law (2012) 1 Acta Juridica 244. 
57 The EEA; Section 6 (1). 
58 J Grogan Dismissal Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 2 ed. (2007) 108. 
59 Du Toit (note 10 above; 68); The EEA; Section 3 (d). 
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In terms of both Convention 111 (Article 1) and the EEA, religion is one of the listed prohibited 
grounds. With the EEA, the use of the words unfairly or unfair means that it would, in certain 
circumstances, be fair to discriminate against an employee.  
The liability imposed on an employer is onerous as the EEA makes reference to the words ‘no 
person’ thereby giving effect to the duty imposed upon the employer. The employer should 
seek to eliminate unfair discrimination in employment policies or practices and is therefore 
required to take steps necessary in promoting equal opportunity in the workplace.60 There is 
therefore a positive obligation on employers to eliminate unfair discrimination. Where 
employers have failed to take cognisance of such a duty, employees have persevered in making 
claims on that basis.61  
 
Henrico states that criticism has been levelled against the manner in which our courts have 
incorrectly and incoherently dealt with discrimination disputes in terms of the discrimination 
test which was set out in Harksen v Lane62 and both the EEA and LRA should not be bypassed 
and should be relied on as enabling legislation in discrimination workplace disputes without 
relying directly on the Constitution. 63  Furthermore effect is given to Convention 111 which 
also serves to provide essential guidelines to courts when dealing with religious discrimination 
disputes. 64  
 
3.2.1.1 Unfair Discrimination in terms of the EEA 
The Act provides for the prohibition of direct or indirect discrimination against any employee 
in any employment practice, irrespective of the motive.65 There does not have to be intention 
to discriminate as the discriminatory practice would be the decisive factor. 66 Discrimination 
does not involve actual prejudice to the individual complaining of the discrimination. 67 The 
courts have held that where discrimination is based on a specified ground then there is a 
presumption of unfairness. If based on some other ground, then the person complaining of the 
discrimination must establish unfairness. Section 6 of the Act indicates that the prohibited 
                                                          
60 The EEA; Section 5 ; Henrico (note 27 above; 281). 
61 Singlee (note 56 above; 1851). 
62 Harksen v Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
63 R Henrico ‘Mutual accommodation of religious differences in the workplace - a jostling of rights’ (2012) 33 
(3) Obiter 512.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Grogan, J Workplace Law 11 ed. (2014)107. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid ; For example where an employee is denied a promotion, the employee does not lose anything as such but 
are denied benefits which should have been rendered to them. 
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grounds listed are not exclusive however discrimination falls within the scope of prohibition 
only if it is on a ground similar to those listed in the definition.68 It is important that an 
employee who alleges discrimination on an arbitrary ground needs to prove that the ground is 
akin to the listed grounds. 69  
 
The Constitutional Court and Labour Courts have emphasized the distinction between the terms 
differentiation and discrimination. The CC in the landmark case of Harksen70 stated that the 
determination as to whether differentiation amounts to unfair discrimination, necessitates a two 
stage analysis 71 Firstly, it should be determined whether differentiation amounts to 
discrimination. Secondly, if differentiation does amount to discrimination, then whether it is 
unfair discrimination. With a specified ground, such as religion, the unfairness is presumed.72 
 
 Where the discrimination is unfair one would have to determine whether the provision is 
justified in terms of the limitation clause. This approach was adopted by Labour courts in 
applying the discrimination clause in the EEA and has been decisively applied by the CC. 73 
The LC judgment of Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler 
Pty Ltd & others74 embraced the Harksen test as highlighted above. 75 The case however 
created some confusion. The court suggested that discrimination may be justified where the 
means are proportional and rational and if the object is legitimate. 76 This would then mean that 
an employer can plead fairness in order to justify the discrimination on prohibited grounds. 
This would be in conflict with what was purported in Convention 111, the Constitution, the 
LRA and EEA. 77 This has the effect of reducing protection available to the employees. 78 Later 
judgments removed the confusion with the CC (Harksen case) and LAC (Mias v Minister of 
Justice & Others (2002) 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) at para 21) re-emphasizing the distinction between 
‘differentiation’ and ‘discrimination’.  
 
                                                          
68 Grogan (note 65 above; 108). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Harksen supra note 63 at para 45. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Gaibie (note 32 above; 27). 
74 Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler Pty Ltd & others (1998) 19 ILJ 285 
(LC). 
75 Gaibie (note 32 above; 28). 
76 Leonard supra note 74.  




3.2.1.2.Employment policy or practice in terms of Section 1 of the EEA  
The court in Department of Correctional Services and another v POPCRU and others79 stated 
that: 
“A policy that effectively punishes the practice of a religion and culture, degrades and devalues the 
followers of that religion and culture in society; it is a palpable invasion of their dignity which says 
their religion or culture is not worthy of protection and the impact of the limitation is profound. That 
impact here was devastating because the respondents’ refusal to yield to an instruction at odds with 
their sincerely held beliefs cost them their employment.”80 The court further held            
“A policy is not justified if it restricts a practice of a religious belief – and by necessary extension, a 
cultural belief - that does not affect an employees’ ability to perform his duties nor jeopardise the safety 
of public or other employees nor cause undue hardship to the employer in a practical sense”. 81 
 
3.2.1.3.Causal Link between differentiation and prohibited ground  
In terms of both Convention 111 and the EEA, religion is listed as a prohibited ground for 
discrimination. It is important that there exists a causal link between differentiation and the 
prohibited ground. 82  In the context of litigation, this means prohibitive burdens of proof 
particularly with regards to the link between differentiation and the ground of discrimination.83 
In Lewis v Media 24 Ltd84 the court held that the employee failed to establish a link between 
differential treatment between employees and the listed grounds.85 The court held that it is not 
enough to allege discrimination on the mere fact that the employee is Jewish and was required 
to work on Saturday which is the Jewish Sabbath unless the employee proves that the employer 
made him work merely because he is Jewish. By considering the evidence it was established 
that the employer had no knowledge that the employee was Jewish. The employer therefore 




                                                          
79 Department of Correctional Services and another v POPCRU and others 2013 4 SA 176 (SCA). 
80 Ibid at para 22. 
81 Ibid at para 25.  
82 Dupper (note 56 above; 244). 
83 Ibid 246. 
84Lewis v Media 24 Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2416 LC.  
85 Ibid 45. 
86 Ibid 124. 
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3.2.1.4. Burden of proof of employer and employee 
In unfair discrimination matters, the onus of proving discrimination rests on the employee 
however once the onus is discharged it  then shifts to the employer where he would be required 
to establish that he has not acted unfairly.  
Where a dispute arises under section 6 (1) of the EEA, the burden of proof is regulated in 
section 11 of the Chapter which states that “whenever unfair discrimination is alleged in terms of 
the Act, the employer against whom the allegation is made must prove on a balance of probabilities that 
such discrimination did not take place as alleged or is rational and not unfair or otherwise justifiable”. 
A burden is therefore imposed on the employer when rebutting a claim of unfair discrimination 
on the grounds of religion of disproving that the discrimination had taken place.  Alternatively 
the employer is required to prove on a balance of probabilities that the act was fair or justified 
and rational. 87 
 
3.2.2. Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
3.2.2.1.Unfair Discrimination in terms of LRA 
In the ordinary sense people would be discriminated against unfairly when they are denied 
privileges or rights that have been given to others.88  
In terms of Section 187 “a dismissal will be automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the 
employee, acts contrary to section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is,… that the employer unfairly 
discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not 
limited to… religion, conscience belief and culture”. 89 In terms of Section 187 (2) (a)90, a dismissal 
based on an inherent requirement of the particular job, may be fair. If a dismissal is in terms of 







                                                          
87 Henrico (note 2 above; 853). 
88 Grogan (note 65 above; 107). 
89 The Labour Relations Act; Section 187 (1) (f). 
90 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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3.2.2.2. Causal Link and Burden of proof in terms of the LRA 
An employee dismissed in terms of Section 187 (1) (f) would be required to discharge the onus 
on a balance of probabilities of proving unfair discrimination on the basis of religion. A causal 
link needs to exist between the reasons for the dismissal as prohibited and the circumstances 
surrounding the dismissal. Once this is established and the court is satisfied that a causal link 
does exist then a rebuttable presumption of unfairness arises. The onus rests on the employer 
to show that the dismissal was fair as the requirement was an inherent requirement of the job 
or that accommodating the employee’s religion would cause an undue hardship on the 
employer.91 Where the employer is unable to provide any justification, then the employee 
would succeed in terms of the Section.  
 
3.3. Direct and indirect discrimination in terms of both LRA and EEA  
Both the LRA and the EEA prohibit direct and indirect unfair discrimination in terms of the 
Convention 111. The prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination is put in place to ensure 
that discrimination in every respect and form is covered by both specified and unspecified 
grounds. 92  
Direct discrimination can be defined as less favourable or unequal treatment on a specified 
ground. Direct discrimination is said to occur when adverse action is taken against a person 
because that person possesses a characteristic of a specified ground or comparable attribute. 
Direct discrimination would be considered as intentional.93  
With indirect discrimination, a practice may appear to be fair in nature however it is in fact 
discriminatory in operation. Grogan describes indirect discrimination as “occurring when 
seemingly objective or neutral barriers exclude members of particular groups because members of those 
groups happen to be unable to surmount the barriers.”94  Indirect discrimination can either be 
intentional or unintentional. There is also no onus on the employee to prove that he suffered a 
loss or was prejudiced. 95 
                                                          
91 Henrico (see note 27; 281).  
92 Gaibie (note 32 above; 32). 
93 Grogan (note 65 above; 108). 
94Ibid; Grogan provides an example of an indirect discrimination- where a height or weight requirement that would 
exclude all but a tiny minority of women. 
95 Grogan (note 65 above; 109). 
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In the Department of Correctional Services and another v Police and Prison Civil Rights Union 
and others96case, the LAC highlighted that the test to establish unfair direct discrimination on 
the grounds of religion and culture is whether the enforcement of the rule that prohibits the 
wearing of dreadlocks interfered with the applicants “participation in or practice or expression of 
their religion or culture”. 97  
 
3.4. Defences To Discrimination 
3.4.1. Introduction  
With a case for discrimination the employer would firstly have to prove the act or omission did 
not amount to unfair discrimination. Employees would be tasked with proving that the 
discrimination did occur.98  
Once unfairness of discrimination is established in terms of the EEA, the process moves to the 
justification process. The employer is required to prove and establish that its conduct although 
discriminatory is not unfair.  
In terms of Section 6 of the EEA the employer would have two opportunities for the 
justification of the discrimination complained of. First is a general defense of fair 
discrimination as set out in the Harksen case and secondly is the two specific defenses as set 
out in the EEA. Section 6 (2) states that “it is not unfair discrimination to distinguish, exclude or 
prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job”.99 The case of Leonard Dingler100 
differed from the Harksen enquiry in that it dealt with fairness and justification in one process. 
Gabie argues that the collapsing of the fairness and justification enquiries is incorrect as the 
CC has consistently applied the Harksen test in this manner. 101 
 
The case of SATAWU obo Finca v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) Ltd & Another102 
established the ruling where the EEA is also applicable to unfair discrimination committed by 
one employee to another. A defence would arise where the discrimination complained of was 
                                                          
96 Department of Correctional Services and another v Police and Prison Civil Rights Union and others 2011 32 
ILJ 2629 (LAC). 
97 POPCRU supra note 96 at para 24 ; B Grant ‘When men wear dreadlocks to work – Department of Correctional 
Services v POPCRU [2012] 2 BCLR 110 (LAC)’ (2012) 33(1) Obiter 181. 
98 Grogan (note 65 above; 117). 
99 The EEA; Section 2. 
100 Leonard supra note 74 at para 295; Gaibie (note 32 above; 29). 
101 Gaibie (note 32 above; 29). 
102 SATAWU obo Finca v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) Ltd & Another (2006) 8 BLLR 737 (LC). 
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perpetrated by another employee and not the employer himself. There is an onus on the 
employer when the conduct is brought to his attention to consult all relevant parties. The 
employer must, in addition, take steps to eliminate the discriminatory conduct in order to 
comply with the Act.103 The employers’ failure to do so where the employee has contravened 
the provision, will be deemed to also be a contravention of the provision by the employer.104 
However this would not be the case “if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was 
reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of the Act”. 105 
The other defence available to the employer is to prove that even though the act or omission 
amounted to discrimination, it was fair. 106 
 
3.4.2 Fair Discrimination  
The onus of proving that the act amounting to discrimination was fair rests of the employer. 107 
The employer has to satisfy the court that the alleged discrimination does not amount to 
discrimination as contemplated in the Act but rather differentiation. 108 The employer would 
be required to prove that the discriminatory act was rational and was fair or justifiable.  
 
3.4.3. Inherent Requirements of the Job  
Section 2 of Convention 111 provides that “any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a 
particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination”. 
This aspect of the Convention has been adopted in the EEA in Section 6 (2) (b) which states 
that it would not be considered as unfair discrimination “to distinguish, exclude or prefer any 
person on the basis of on an inherent requirement of a job”.  
The Labour Relations Act states as follows:  
                                                          
103 The EEA; Section 60 (1) & (2). 
104 The EEA; Section 60 (3).  
105 The EEA; Section 60 (4).  
106 Grogan (note 65 above; 118). 
107 Section 11 of the Act states: “Whenever unfair discrimination is alleged in terms of the Act, the employer 
against whom the allegation was made must establish that it is fair”.  
108 Grogan (note 65 above; 118). 
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“Despite subsection 187 (1) (f) 109a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on an 
inherent requirement of a particular job”. 110   
 
The term ‘inherent’ can be interpreted as “existing in something, a permanent attribute or quality, 
forming an element, especially an essential element, or something essential”. 111 Grogan defines the 
term as relating to “the possession of a particular personal physical attribute which must be necessary 
for effectively carrying out the duties attached to a particular position”.112 
Inherent requirements of a job are requirements which, if removed from the job, would have 
the effect of dramatically altering the nature of the job. 113 
 
In Dlamini & others v Green Four Security 114 the Applicants brought the matter before the 
Labour Court averring that they had been discriminated against on the basis of religion and 
that, in terms of Section 187 (f) of the LRA, their dismissal was automatically unfair.  
The court had to determine whether the workplace rule requiring employees to be clean-shaven 
was an inherent requirement of the job and justified as this was one of the issues in dispute for 
determination. An inherent requirement of the job may still be considered discriminatory if 
there was no reasonable accommodation or adjustment of the rule when there is a duty to do 
so. 115  
The court stated that it is an established rule that “the more serious the impact of the workplace 
rule on the freedom of religion, the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be”.116 The 
employees did not dispute that neatness was an inherent requirement of a job however they 
disputed that having an untrimmed beard was untidy. The court had to therefore decide whether 
the untrimmed beard was neat or not. 117The court held that the Respondents rule was neither 
arbitrary nor irrational and that the effect of the rule would have had a greater impact had the 
                                                          
109 Section 187 (1) (f) provides that “dismissal is automatically unfair …if the reason for the dismissal is that the 
employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly on an arbitrary ground including but 
not limited to …religion”.  
110 The LRA; Section 187 (2).   
111  D DuToit Labour Relations Law -A comprehensive guide 4 ed (2006) 569.  
112 Grogan, J Workplace Law 11 ed. (2008) 295 – 296. 
113 A Rycroft ‘Inherent requirements of a job’ (2015) 36 ILJ 900. 
114Dlamini & others v Green Four Security (2006) 11 BLLR 1074 (LC).  
115 Ibid 13. 




Applicants not practiced their religion so flexibly.118  The courts concluded that the workplace 
rule was an inherent requirement and was justified. 119  
In POPCRU 120 the Department failed to prove that its policy had any impact on the way in 
which the employees had performed their duties. As a result it could not be established as an 
inherent requirement of the job. It is not always the case that compliance with a particular dress 
code is not seen as an inherent requirement, as was the case in POPCRU121. It is of utmost 
importance that adjudicators seek to determine whether a requirement is essential to achieve a 
















                                                          
118Ibid 62. 
119 Ibid 66-67. 
120 POPCRU supra note 79.  
121 Ibid.  
122 Rycroft (note 113 above; 906). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: REASONABLE ACCOMODATION IN THE WORKPLACE  
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
The right to freedom of religion is one that is fundamental and is enshrined in the        
Constitution.123 The concept of freedom of religion encapsulates the right to practice ones 
religion without fear of any hindrance or reprisal and to be able to express that belief       
publicly.124 It allows one to practice their religion without any intrusion from other individuals 
and the state. 125 
A question that often gets asked in the context of labour law is to what extent can freedom of 
religion be exercised in the workplace. Should the employee be expected to leave their religious 
practices and beliefs behind when entering the workplace? Surely this should not be the case 
as religion is an essential and intrinsic element of a person’s identity. 126 Additionally how can 
employers conduct their workplace environment in a manner that has order and that is efficient 
whilst at the same time seeking to accommodate their employees’ religious rights and 
freedoms?  
The courts have been instrumental in balancing the rights of both employer and employee and 
adopting the thinking that religious intolerance and the adoption of policies that are rigid would 
ultimately hamper the right to freedom of religion.  
 
4.2. CONCEPT OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION  
The EEA defines reasonable accommodation in Section 1 as “any modification or adjustment to 
a job or working environment that will enable the employee from a designated group to have access to, 
or participate in employment”. The EEA addresses the concept of reasonable accommodation 
from the perspective of disability, however it can be applied in terms of religious discrimination 
disputes.  
In the case of Pillay127 the Constitutional Court stated that “reasonable accommodation is most 
appropriate where… discrimination arises from a rule or practice that is neutral on its face and is 
designed to serve a valuable purpose, but which nevertheless has a marginalizing effect on certain 
                                                          
123 The Constitution; Section 15. 
124 Lawrence supra note 16 at 92; De Waal (note 28 above; 339).  
125 Bernard (note 55 above; 2870).  
126 Ibid 2871. 
127 Pillay supra note 14.  
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portions of society. Second the principle is particularly appropriate in specific localized contexts, such 
as an individual workplace or school where a reasonable balance between conflicting interests may 
more easily be struck”.128 
The concept of reasonable accommodation has been explored in several labour cases and the 
courts have provided a level of certainty for future reference.  
 
4.3. EMPLOYERS DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE  
In South Africa it has been established by case law that there is a certain duty that rests on an 
employer to reasonably accommodate diversity in the workplace. Employers shouldn’t 
experience undue hardship when doing so.129   
In the case of POPCRU130 the court addressed the issue of reasonable accommodation in the 
workplace.  
The court in dealing with the issue of reasonable accommodation stated that “diversity is an 
exercise in proportionality bearing upon the rationality of the means of achieving the legitimate purpose 
of the prohibition”. 131  The court made reference to the case of Pillay 132  highlighting the 
Constitutional Courts continuous expression for the need for reasonable accommodation. The 
court warned against employers placing restrictions on religious and cultural practices where 
employees have “the burdensome choice of being true to their faith at the expense of being respectful 
of the management prerogative and authority”. 133 
The court correctly and importantly highlighted,  
“While I accept the importance of uniforms in promoting a culture of discipline and respect for 
authority, we live in a constitutional order founded upon a unique social and cultural diversity which, 
because of our past history, deserves to be afforded special protection. It is doubtful that the admirable 
purposes served by uniforms will be undermined by reasonable accommodation of that diversity by 
granting religious and cultural exemptions where justified.”134 
                                                          
128 Ibid 78. 
129 Bernard (note 55 above; 2880); Pillay, Dlamini, Popcru and Kievits cases establish the employers’ duty to 
accommodate).   
130 POPCRU supra note 79.  
131 Ibid 43. 
132 Pillay supra note 14. 
133 POPCRU supra note 79. 
134 Ibid 49. 
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The court in POPCRU held that the employers refusal to reasonably accommodate diversity 
resulted in a prohibition which was discriminatory was “unfair, disproportionate and overly 
restrictive”. 135 
 
4.4. EXTENT OF THE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE  
In dealing with the concepts of the duty to accommodate, the courts are required to determine 
the extent to which the obligation applies. The court is required to evaluate “any impairment to 
the dignity of the complainants, the impact upon them, and whether there are less restrictive and less 
disadvantageous means of achieving that purpose”.136 The employer has to show a link between 
the discriminatory measure and purpose. In the LAC decision of the POPCRU case the court 
held that there was no connection between the purpose and the measure.  Furthermore it was 
not shown that the Department would suffer a burden which was unreasonable if it granted an 
exemption to the employees. As a result the Appeal had to fail.  
In the case of Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 137  the court 
emphasized that the state should, wherever possible, avoid placing intensely painful and 
burdensome choices on individuals to either choose their religious and cultural practices or 
abiding by the law.138 
 
There is therefore a need for society to act positively in accommodating diversity. It may be 
as simple as granting exemptions from a rule or even the modification of buildings or 
reasonable monetary loss being incurred.139The court in Pillay140 looked into the extent of the 
duty to accommodate and comparatively viewed different positions taken in international 
jurisdictions.  In both Canada and United States the term ‘undue hardship’ has been adopted 
as the test for reasonable accommodation.  However the United States Supreme Court of 
Appeal has held that in order to accommodate a person’s religion the employer need only 
incur a de minimus cost. 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court on the other hand has declined that standard. It has emphasized 
that more is required than just a mere negligible effort. The court stated that the Canadian 
                                                          
135Ibid 51. 
136 Ibid 43; Bernard (note 55 above; 2880).  
137Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC).   
138 Ibid. 
139 Pillay supra note 14 at para 75. 
140 Pillay supra note 14. 
27 
  
approach is in line with the South African Constitutional order however reasonable 
accommodation will be looked at on a case by case basis and will depend on the set of facts 
presented to court and the question will be a contextual one in line with the values and 
principles underlying the Constitution141  
The court in Pillay went on to highlight that a person who merely adheres to a religious or 
cultural practice but is willing to sacrifice the practice if required to do so cannot demand the 
same accommodation as those who strictly adhere to the belief and whose identity will be 
undermined. 142 The court cited Christian Education case which held that 
 “It is true that to single out a member of a religious community for disadvantageous treatment would, 
on the face of it, constitute unfair discrimination against that community. The contrary, however, does 
not hold true. To grant respect to sincerely held religious views of a community and make an exception 
from a general law to accommodate them, would not be unfair to anyone else who did not hold those 
views.”143 If accommodating a religious practice becomes unreasonably burdensome on an 
employer then it may refuse to make an allowance for the practice.144  
 
Dlamini & others v Green Four Security in dealing with the issue of reasonable 
accommodation, established that the onus was on the Respondents to show that it had 
attempted accommodating the employees. The court held that whether the respondents 
attempted accommodating the employees or not was irrelevant as that was not the basis for 
the dismissal. Furthermore the Applicants indicated that had the employers granted an 
accommodation they still would not have accepted it as it was against their religion to trim 









                                                          
141 Pillay supra note 14 at para 76. 
142 Ibid 86.   
143 Ibid 103.  
144 Ibid 107. 
145 Dlamini supra note 114 at para 70. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS  
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
For many years South Africa has adopted a comparative law approach to foreign precedent and 
international law.146 In the case of S v Makwanyane147 Chaskalson pointed out that  
“ In dealing with comparative law we must bear in mind that we are required to construe the South 
African Constitution and not an international instrument or the constitution of some foreign country, 
and this has to be done with due regard to our legal system, history and circumstances having regard to 
our own Constitution. We can derive assistance from public international law and foreign case law 
however but we are in no way bound to follow it”.  
 
In order to evolve the South African approach to the constitutional rights to religious and 
cultural freedom it can be useful in assessing the ways other legal systems have dealt with such 
issues. The courts use of foreign and international law in the area of religion is particularly 
noteworthy. 148 The case of S v Lawrence, S v Negal, S v Solberg149 adopted the Canadian 
definition of freedom of religion.150 This definition has been recognized by the CC on various 
occasions. 151 
Judge Sachs in this judgement emphasized that the use of foreign jurisdiction is needed in order 
to develop legal doctrines in South Africa however its use should be limited and used in 
context. He cited as follows:  
“In Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and another152 this Court cautioned against the simplistic transplantation 
into our jurisprudence of formulae modes of classification and legal doctrine developed in other 
countries where the constitutional texts and socio- historical situations were different from ours. … If I 
draw on statements by certain United States Supreme Court Justices, I do so not because I treat their 
decisions as precedents to be applied by our courts but because their dicta articulate in an elegant and 
helpful manner problems which face any modern court... Thus though drawn from another legal culture, 
                                                          
146 C Rautenbach ‘The South African Constitutional Courts use of foreign precedent in matters of religion: without 
fear or favour’ (2015)18(5) PELJ 1546. 
147 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) at para 39. 
148 Rautenbach (note 146 above; 1550). 
149 Lawrence supra note 17. 
150 C Rautenbach (note 146 above; 1554); Drug Mart supra note 17 at 92. 
151 In Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) the Canadian Drug Mart case was cited for its 
definition of freedom of religion.   
152 Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and another 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC). 
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they express values and dilemmas in a way which I find most helpful in elucidating the meaning of our 
own constitutional text.” 153 
 
In Pillay 154  Justice Langa in evaluating the application of ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
considered how the United States and Canada applied the test for reasonable accommodation.  
 
5.2. UNITED STATES 
5.2.1. Introduction 
The Congress in the United States passed the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which 
sought to eradicate religious discrimination in the workplace.155  This piece of legislation 
sought to regulate employment relations by preventing employers from discriminating and 
“limiting, segregating or classifying his employees in any way which would deprive any individual 
from opportunities, adversely affect his status as an employee because of his or her religion.”156 
 
5.2.2. Reasonable Accommodation  
Despite these laws protecting employees, the question that remained was whether there was a 
duty that existed on the part of the employer to actively accommodate religion in the workplace. 
It would appear that case law held that there was indeed a positive obligation on employers to 
accommodate employees.  
Religion means “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employees 
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business”.157 
The burden of proof would therefore shift on the employer once a need for accommodation is 
asserted by the employee.  
The introduction of the definition of religion now places a positive duty on employers to 
accommodate religion in the workplace in the United States.  
 
                                                          
153 C Rautenbach (note 146 above; 1555) ; Lawrence supra note 17 at para 141. 
154 Pillay supra note 14. 
155 R J Friedman ‘Religious Discrimination in the workplace: The persistent polarized struggle’ (2008) 27(1) 
Midwest BLSA L.J 29; The statute states: “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his religion”. 
156 Friedman (note 155 above; 30).  
157 Friedman (note 155 above; 31). 
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In the case of Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division 158   the 
Supreme Court found in favour of the employee and granted unemployment compensation as 
requested by the employee. The employee did not want to deal with the production of weapons 
as he believed it violated his religious beliefs. Similarly in the case of Frazee v Ill. Department 
of Employment Security159 the court decided in favour of the employee. The employee refused 
to accept a job assignment requiring him to work on Sundays which violated his religious 
rights. The court held that it was satisfied that employees had sincerely held beliefs.160 
 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Remedial Education and Diagnostic Services 
Inc. 161 the court held that the wearing of a headscarf by a woman of the Islamic faith “was 
protected despite the fact that the covering failed to satisfy the doctrinal requirements of the Islamic 
faith”. 162 
 
In EEOC v Ilona of Hungary, Inc 163 the employee admitted that she is not a religious person 
and didn’t observe Jewish holidays. Despite these admissions, the court held that the employee 
requesting time from work for the Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur, was a genuine manifestation 
of her religious faith.164 From the above cases we see that the court readily accommodates and 
accepts the employee’s religious practices without second-guessing whether the practice is 
indeed a sincere one. 165 The burden of proof required by the employee to prove his or her 
sincerity of religious belief is low.166  
 
As stated above, the definition of religion placed a duty on employers to accommodate religion 
in the workplace, unless the employer demonstrates undue hardship that would be experienced 
in accommodating the employee. This results in the burden shifting back to the employee where 
it remains. 167 The United States adopts a three step approach as a test for the evaluation of 
religious accommodation for an employee. Firstly the employees’ religious belief must be 
sincere. Secondly, where there is conflict between an employees’ job responsibility and 
                                                          
158Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
159Frazee v Ill. Department of Employment Security 489 U.S 829 (1989). 
160 Friedman (note 155 above; 33). 
161 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Remedial Education and Diagnostic Services Inc. 759 F sup 
1150.  
162 Friedman (note 155 above; 33). 
163 EEOC v Ilona of Hungary, Inc 108 F. 3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1996, modified on rehearing Mar 6, 1997).   
164 Friedman (note 155 above; 34). 
165 Ibid 33. 
166 Ibid 34. 
167 Friedman (note 155 above; 35). 
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religious observance, the employee must communicate this to the employer. Thirdly an 
employee must establish that if he is not accommodated by the employer, he will endure 
hardship. 168  If the employee meets the test then an employer is required to reasonably 
accommodate the employee. The exception however is if the employer demonstrates an undue 
hardship then he is not required to accommodate the employee. 
  
Undue hardship has been said to constitute any monetary cost above de minimus.169 This differs 
from the Canadian and South African approach which prescribes more than a minor effort to 
accommodate. The court in Webb v City of Phila170 has also found that a female officer who 
wore a headscarf could result in hardship on the employer as it was contrary to the dress code 
of police officers. 171 Damage done to an employer’s image could also meet the de minimus 
standard of undue hardship.172  
 
The concept of undue hardship was dealt with in Trans World Airlines Inc. v Hardison173 
The plaintiff requested that he be given time off from his job as a stores clerk because of the 
Sabbath which required him to refrain from working from sundown Friday to sundown 
Saturday. His employer refused to grant him accommodation. The court held that to require the 
employer to endure more than a de minimus cost in order to give the employee off on Saturdays 
constituted an undue hardship.174 The case resulted in implications for employees exercising 
their religious rights and leaves employees in a vulnerable position. 
 
5.3. CANADA 
5.3.1. Introduction  
The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which forms part of the 
Constitution, 1982 (the “CCRF”) resulted in the protection of religious freedom.  
Section 2 which emphasizes religious freedom and states:  
“Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms  
(a) Freedom of conscience and religion” 
                                                          
168 Ibid  36. 
169 V David ‘Chapter 287:Religious Accommodation for Employees’ (2013) 680 (44) Mc George L Rev. 691. 
170 Webb v City of Phila 562 F.3d 256, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2009).  
171 David (note 169 above; 691). 
172 Cloutier v Costco Wholesale Corp 390 F. 3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004) ; David (note 169 above; 691). 
173 Trans World Airlines Inc. v Hardison 432 U. S 63 (1977).  
174 Friedman (note 155 above; 36-37). 
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Section 15(1) also provides for religious freedom and states that “every individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on… religion”. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada interprets freedom of religion under the CCRF to include the 
freedom to express ones religious beliefs.175 In the case of Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem176the 
SCA held when it comes to an infringement of a person’s freedom of religion, a claimant must 
establish that the belief in the practice is sincere and there is a link or nexus with religion. 
Furthermore the interference by the state results in him or her not being able to act in 
accordance with the belief or practice. It was further stated that the religious practice or belief must 
not be “fictitious, capricious or an artifice”.177 
 
In Multani v Commission scolaire Margeurite- Bourgeouys 178  the court was tasked with 
determining a student’s right to demonstrate a religious practice by wearing a kirpan 
(ceremonial dagger). The court stated that it is not necessary for the student to establish that 
the kirpan is not a weapon. The student needed to demonstrate that his “personal and subjective 
belief in the religious significance of the kirpan is sincere”.179 
 
When assessing a constitutional regulation of religion in the workplace the court will have to 
interpret the scope of freedom of religion and conscience180 and the equality guarantee181  
within the reasonable limits provision in terms of Section 1 of the Charter.182 
The courts have developed a proportionality test in applying the Section 1` analysis. A person 
will have the onus of proving on a balance of probabilities that the infringement was reasonable 
and justified. Two requirements should be fulfilled in this regard. Firstly the legislative aim 
sought must be important enough to limit the constitutional right. Secondly, the means in doing 
so must be proportional and reasonably linked to the objective. The right should not be 
                                                          
175 L Sossin ‘God at work: Religion in the workplace and the limits of pluralism in Canada’ (2008- 2009) 30 
Comp. Lab. L & Poly J. 485 at 489. 
176 Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem (2004) 2 S.C.R 551(Can). 
177 Sossin (note 175; 489); Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem (2004) 2 S.C.R 551(Can) at para 52. 
178 Multani v Commission scolaire Margeurite- Bourgeouys (2006) 1 S.C.R 259 at para 37. 
179 Sossin (note 175; 490); Multani supra note 178 at para 37.  
180 The Charter;Section 2(a).  
181 The Charter; Section 15(1).  
182 Sossin (note 175; 490). 
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infringed any more than is required and the effects of the infringement should not be 
disproportionate. 183  
 
In addition to the CCRF, as highlighted above, there are several Human Rights instruments 
with the aim of protecting the freedom from religious discrimination in the workplace. The 
CCRF applies to state action solely whereas the human rights statues would be applicable in 
both the public and private spheres which would include the workplace. 184 
 
Section 5 (1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code provides that “every person has a right to equal 
treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, 
colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, 
family status or disability”. The provision is qualified by the following:  
“Section 11 (1)185 - A right of a person under Part I is infringed where a requirement, qualification or 
factor exists that is not discrimination on a prohibited ground but that results in the exclusion, restriction 
or preference of a group of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination and of 
whom the person is a member, except where,  
(a) the requirement, qualification or factor is reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances; or  
(b) it is declared in this Act other than in Section 17, that to discriminate because of such grounds 
is not an infringement of a right.   
(2) The Commission, the Tribunal or a court shall not find that a requirement, qualification or factor is 
reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances unless it is satisfied that the needs of the group of which 
the person is a member cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for 
accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any and health and 
safety requirements, if any.”    
 
A duty therefore exists on employers to accommodate and to take steps in order to eliminate 
disadvantages to employees unless it has the result of causing “undue hardship” for the 
employer.  
 
In Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons- Sears Ltd186 the plaintiff worked in a 
department store. She was a member of a Church and requested that, in order to observe the 
Sabbath, she be exempt from working on Friday evenings and Saturdays. Her employer failed 
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to accommodate her request. The SCA highlighted that intention is not a necessary requirement 
when proving a contravention of the code. It held that the employer was guilty of contravening 
the code. The employer has an onus of demonstrating that, should the employee be 
accommodated this will result in an undue hardship. If no undue hardship exists then the duty 
to accommodate the employee remains. 187  
 
5.3.2 Operational Requirements 
The case of Bhinder v Canadian National Railway Co. 188  dealt with an issue regarding 
workplace dress code. The employee was a maintenance electrician employed by Canadian 
National Railway who was required in terms of a policy to wear a hard hat. Being a Sikh, the 
employee was required to adhere to wearing a turban and it was therefore contrary to his 
religion to wear any other hat. He therefore refused to wear the hard hat and was dismissed. He 
then filed a complaint against the employer on the basis that they had violated the Canadian 
Human Rights Act. The human rights tribunal found in favour of the employee which was later 
reversed by the Federal Court of Appeal on the basis that the employer’s policy constituted a 
“bona fide operational requirement”.  
 
The SCA then found in favour of the employee. Exempting the employee from wearing a hard 
hat would not have imposed a hardship on the employer. It was noted that the Canadian Human 
Rights Act does not require the accommodation of an employee if it is conflicting with 
occupational requirements of a job. The courts had to determine the employers’ reasons for 
implementing the rule. If implementing the rule was for genuine business reasons and not done 
maliciously then no guilt can be contributed to the employer.189 
 
Another aspect that the Canadian courts have looked at was the issue of religious holidays and 
observances during working hours. In Alberta Human Rights Commission v Central Alberta 
Dairy Pool190 the employee, in terms of his religion, was not allowed to work on certain days 
and on religious holidays.  
The employee requested to be excused from work on a religious holiday however his request 
was denied by his employer. The employee was later dismissed.191 The issues before the 
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Supreme Court were whether the dismissal could be justified as the requirement to work was 
a bona fide occupational requirement. If the employer could not justify that it was in fact a 
bona fide occupational requirement then the courts had to determine whether the employer 
reasonably accommodated the employees’ religious belief to the point of undue hardship.192 
The court held that the employer failed to accommodate the employee. In addition the court 
found that there was no bona fide occupational requirement.193 The court has not defined the 
term “undue hardship” but has emphasized that it should be determined on a case by case 
basis.194 
Religion in the workplace is further governed by labour and employment law and the statutes 
which govern the two set out minimum standards to be complied with in all workplaces.195 
 
The case of Commission scolaire regionale de Chambly v Bergevin196 dealt with three Jewish 
teachers who took a day off to celebrate the religious Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur. They were 
granted leave of absence but without pay which led to them lodging a grievance for 
reimbursement of payment. The school calendar was part of a collective agreement which 
confirmed the schedule of the teachers.  However it was found by the Supreme Court of Canada 
that requiring Jewish staff to work on Yom Kippur was discriminatory and that no reasonable 
steps had been taken to accommodate the teachers’ religious beliefs. The court further held that 
a de minimus test should not apply when evaluating the duty to accommodate.  The agreement 
provided for teachers to be paid where there was a good and valid reason for being absent and 
the court held that observing a religious day did constitute a valid and good reason.  
 
5.4. UNITED KINGDOM               
5.4.1. Introduction  
The Human Rights Act of 1998 incorporating Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the “ECHR”) which provided for discrimination in the workplace was later extended, 
with the implementation of the European Community Directive 2000/78, to include the grounds 
                                                          
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid at para 1 page 529 – 530.  
194 P Bowal ; M Goloubev ‘ Religious Accommodation in the Workplace’ (2010- 2011) 35 LawNow 19 at page 
21.   
195 Ibid at para 1 page 497- 498. 
196 Commission scolaire regionale de Chambly v Bergevin 1994 (2) S.C.R. 525(Can.).  
36 
  
of religion and belief.197  The Employment Equality Regulations, 2003 (the “Regulations”) 
provides for protection against unfair discrimination on the ground of religion.  
 
These regulations have the effect of eradicating discrimination caused by the employer aswell 
as unreasonable refusals to accommodate employee’s religious beliefs. 198  The Human Rights 
Act, 1998 provides for the protection of human rights of employees within the public sector.199  
 
Article 9 of the ECHR provides for the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
However the right is qualified by restrictions, should the manifestation of the right interfere 
with the rights of others. The courts will have to consider whether limitations serve a legitimate 
aim and may be justified. “Public safety, public health, national security, protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others and preventing fundamentalist religious movements from exerting pressure on 
others” are all grounds which limit freedom of religion, thought and conscience.200 
 
A religious expression could be in the form of worship, teaching, a practice and an observance. 
Whether a declaration or expression of a religious belief or practice is accepted would be a 
subjective enquiry by the courts and determined on the facts of each case.201  
 
Article 14 of the Convention states as follows: 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion …birth or other status.”  
Article 14 is to be interpreted with Article 9 and cannot be applied on its own. The test would 
be “whether or not the applicant has been treated in a different way and if there is differential treatment 
whether such treatment is justified”. The onus rests on the state to show that “the limitation was 
objectively and reasonably justifiable”. The ECHR will not likely consider a claim for 
discrimination if there is no violation of Article 9.202 
 
 
                                                          
197 M Freedland ; L Vickers ‘ Religious Expression in the Workplace in the United Kingdom’ (2008-2009) 30 
Comp. Lab. L & Pol’y  597. 
198 Ibid 601. 
199 Ibid 602. 
200  J Squelch ‘Religious Symbols in the Workplace: Balancing the Respective Rights of Employees and 
Employers’ (2013) 20 Murdoch U.L. Rev. 38 at 46. 
201 Ibid 44-45. 
202 Ibid 48. 
37 
  
5.4.2. Direct Discrimination  
This concept is defined as less favorable “on grounds of … religion or belief”. It would include 
discrimination on the basis of an individual’s actual religion or belief or perceived belief or 
religion. The exception to the rule would be an occupational requirement of a job.  
 
In terms of Regulation 7 (2), non-discrimination duty would not apply where:  
“(a) being of a particular religion is a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement of the job; and  
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case ”.  
 
The exception will only apply where there exists a nexus between the work to be done and 
characteristics required. 203  
When dealing with an occupational requirement which is religious in nature, the requirement 
must be proportionate and will need to serve a legitimate aim. There should also be no alternate 
less discriminatory way to achieve the purpose.204 
 
5.4.3. Indirect Discrimination  
This concept refers to a practice or criterion that would put a person of a particular religion at 
a disadvantage as compared to other individuals who are not necessarily of the same religion.205 
With indirect discrimination, it needs to be established that the work requirement would have 
the effect of operating to the disadvantage of the religious group.  
The test would be whether it is more difficult for the employee to act in accordance with with 
the requirement therefore putting that employee at a disadvantage as opposed to other 
employees. 206 If the work requirement is putting the employee at a disadvantage then this will 
constitute unlawful indirect discrimination and the requirement is incapable of being justified. 
The onus would rest of the employee where he will be required to demonstrate that the 
requirement places him/her at a disadvantage. The onus will then shift to the employer to show 
that the requirement is justified as a “proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.  
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5.4.4. Dress Codes in the workplace 
There would often be instances where employers impose dress codes on employees which 
could leave these employees at a disadvantage where they are unable to comply due to their 
religious beliefs. Conversely the employer may ban certain religious symbols. 207 A legitimate 
aim for a particular dress code may exist however a refusal to adhere to a dress code by an 
employee would have to be proportionate. A balancing act of competing interests in assessing 
justification and proportionality would have to be conducted.  
 
A critical question that has arisen in the United Kingdom is the allowance of Muslim female 
employees to wear the headscarf in the workplace. Preventing a Muslim female from wearing 
a headscarf would require a determination of whether the restriction is proportionate to a 
legitimate aim.208 These aims will have be balanced against the interests of the restricted person 
and should only be implemented if it is proportional to the aim. 209  
 
In the case of Eweida and others v The United Kingdom210 the court had to decide on the 
employees’ right to visibly wear a cross to work. The employee Ms. Eweida was required to 
wear a formal uniform as she worked at the check-in section at British Airways.211  The 
companies’ uniform policy required clothing or accessories worn for religious purposes to be 
concealed. Items that could not be concealed were sometimes permitted.212  She initially wore 
her cross concealed but later on she did not conceal it. Due to her failure and refusal to conceal 
the cross, she was sent home without pay and remained at home for 6 months. A different 
position that did not require her to wear a uniform was offered to her however she declined this 
offer. 213 Having received negative publicity, the company had changed its uniform policy. The 
employee returned to work and was allowed to wear her cross. However British Airways failed 
to compensate her.214    
 
In 2008 the employee took the matter up with the Employment Tribunal (the “ET”) for indirect 
discrimination on the basis of religion.215 The Tribunal, Employment Appeal Tribunal (the 
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“EAT”) and Court of Appeal all rejected her claim finding the rule as a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim.216 British Airways had attempted to accommodate the employee 
by placing her in another section however the employee did not accept this and chose to stay 
at home.217 The Supreme Court refused the employee leave to appeal.218 Mrs Chaplin a second 
Applicant brought a similar claim. She worked in a hospital and the hospital policy stated that 
necklaces shouldn’t be worn to prevent injury to patients when they are being attended to. 219  
 
She applied to the ET complaining of both direct and indirect discrimination on religious 
grounds. The ET held that there was no direct discrimination as the restriction was based on 
health and the safety of its patients and not religious grounds and furthermore no “persons” 
other than the applicant was restricted.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) highlighted that freedom of religion as set out 
in Article 9 also includes a freedom to manifest ones belief.220 To constitute a manifestation, 
the act must be linked to the religious belief. Hence no onus exists on the applicant “to show 
that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in question”. 221  The court 
ultimately found all claims admissible.  However the court did find that Ms. Chaplin was 
directly discriminated against.  
 
The Court had to examine whether the right to wear her cross was secured by a domestic legal 
order.222 The lack of protection under domestic law would mean that the applicant’s right to 
manifest her religion at work was insufficiently protected223  
 
The Court therefore concluded that, “the domestic authorities failed sufficiently to protect the first 
applicant’s right to manifest her religion, in breach of the positive obligation under Article 9”. 
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The Court considered the second applicants claim.  The court noted that the reason for asking 
her to remove the cross for health and safety reasons was more significant than the reasons in 
Ms. Eweidas situation.  
The Court couldn’t conclude that the measures taken were disproportionate. The intrusion was 
necessary and Article 9 was not violated.224  
 
5.4.5. Defences  
Two defences that exist in respect of the Regulations are Genuine Occupational Requirements 
or justifications for indirect discrimination. In balancing competing interests the court will have 
to do so in assessing proportionality. Factors that would be considered to determine 
proportionality would be “the status of the employer; the existence of a right to freedom of religion 
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CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW  
It would appear that the courts have taken a context – sensitive approach rather than a rigid 
adherence to a formal or universal test when adjudicating workplace religious discrimination 
disputes.  
6.1. Department of Correctional Services and another v Police and Prison Civil Rights 
Union and others 2011 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC) 
The court in this case had to consider the dismissal of five employees who were employed by 
the Department of Correctional Services that were automatically unfair in terms of Section 
187(1) (f) of the LRA. The Applicants in this case alleged that they had been dismissed as a 
result of a manifestation of their religious beliefs by wearing their hair in dreadlocks and 
refusing to cut it off when ordered to do so. None of them had any prior disciplinary violations.  
They wore their hair in dreadlocks for some time before being asked to cut them off226. The 
Area Commissioner indicated that it was necessary to implement such changes as the poor 
discipline was due to non-compliance of policies and dress codes.227 The employees failed to 
comply with written instruction due to their religious and/or cultural beliefs which resulted in 
their dismissals.228 They approached the LC claiming that their dismissals were automatically 
unfair in terms of Section 187(1) (f) of the LRA and that their dismissal constituted unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of religion and culture in terms of Section 6 of the EEA. 
The employees also emphasized their female colleagues were permitted to wear dreadlocks and 
the dress code allowed them to do so.229 
The LC held that the dismissal amounted to direct unfair discrimination in terms of Section 6 
of the EEA on the grounds of gender and that the dismissals were automatically unfair in terms 
of Section 187 (1)(f) of the LRA.  
The Department and area commissioner then appealed the decision of the court a quo. The 
LAC when dealing with the claim of unfair discrimination had to determine whether there was 
differentiation between employees or groups of employees “which imposes burdens, 
disadvantages, withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from certain employees on one or more 
of the prohibited grounds”. 230 
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The employees, when claiming religious discrimination, had to prove that the employers 
restricted their practice, participation or expression of their religion and culture. If 
differentiation on the grounds of religion and culture and gender are shown, unfairness is 
presumed and the employers bear the onus of rebutting the presumption. 231 
In terms of Section 187 (2) (a) of the LRA, a dismissal may be fair if it is justified on the basis 
of an inherent requirement of a job. 232 
The employees had worn dreadlocks for the purpose of an expression of their Rastafari religion 
or as an expression of the Xhosa spiritual healing. The CC has recognized Rastafarianism as a 
religion which should be protected in terms of the Bill of Rights. 233 
The employers had not disputed that wearing dreadlocks was a central tenet of Rastafarianism 
and similarly worn as an adornment in following the traditions of the Xhosa culture. 234 
Courts don’t usually concern themselves with the centrality or rationality of beliefs and 
practices provided the declaration of belief is done in good faith and sincerely.235 
The court stated that the employees had all worn dreadlocks as an expression of their religious 
and cultural beliefs and such protection is enshrined in the Constitutions’ commitment to affirm 
diversity in this country. 236 
The LAC found that the lower court erroneously held that there was no discrimination on 
religious and cultural grounds because the employees failed to assert their rights. The court 
further stated that the failure by the employees to assert their rights would not render 
discriminatory action non-discriminatory. 237 
The Court held that the implementation of the Dress code was in fact discriminatory in nature 
twofold: firstly the employees were treated less favorably than their female counterparts and 
secondly, they were treated less favorably than those who were not affected by the Code. 238   
The court held further that the real enquiry that needs to be determined is whether the 
discrimination was fair or justifiable. 239 
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In terms of the Harksen v Lane240 case, where a prohibition is discriminatory on specified 
grounds, it is presumed to be unfair. The employers stated that the reasons for the dismissals 
of the employees was to deal with the deterioration of discipline by ensuring compliance with 
policies. The question that the court needed to consider was whether this reasoning excludes 
the dismissal from being automatically unfair. 241  
The court should not restrict its enquiry to a subjective reason. 242 The court correctly stated 
“Usually motive and intention are irrelevant to the determination of discrimination because that 
is considered by asking the question: would the complainant have received the same treatment 
from the defendant or respondent but for his or her gender, religion, culture etc?” 243 
When it comes to direct discrimination, it is not required that the employer intended to act in a 
discriminatory manner or that he realized he is doing so. Where factual criteria is unclear the 
court may investigate the mental processes of the employer. The court held after considering 
the evidence that the dismissal was discrimination on the grounds of gender, religion and 
culture. 244 
The court then turned to the issue of whether the differential treatment is fair and justifiable. A 
dismissal is automatically unfair if the discrimination is unfair.  
The court stated : “the test of unfairness under these provisions concentrates upon the nature and 
extent of the limitation of the respondent’s rights; the impact of the discrimination on the complainants; 
the social position of the complainants; whether the discrimination impairs the dignity of the 
complainants; whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; and whether reasonable steps have 
been taken to accommodate the diversity sought to be advanced and protected by the principle of non-
discrimination”.245 
 
In the present case, there was no direct reliance on the Constitution however when determining 
fairness, the court may have regard to the limitations analysis under the Constitution.246 
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The purpose of the employers implementing the rule was to achieve uniformity and neatness 
to achieve discipline. 247  The employer would be required to demonstrate that the 
discriminatory restriction achieves its purpose. A rational or proportional link between the 
measure and the purpose being sought must exist. 248 
 
The court held that the employer failed to establish that short or un-dreadlocked hair was an 
inherent requirement of the job and the argument that short hair resulted in a safer environment 
in prison could not be entertained. Firstly, the argument did not apply to females and secondly 
there was no evidence showing that such threats outweigh the rights to equality and dignity. 249  
 
The court found that there was no rational connection between the purpose and the measure as 
there was no evidence that the respondents’ hairstyles were untidy in any way given the fact 
that the employers had indicated that neatness were the reasons for the discrimination.250There 
was no rational basis that dreadlocks lead to poor discipline. 251 
 
The employees showed no evidence that correctional officers who wore dreads were less 
disciplined than their colleagues.252 On the contrary the correctional officers were exemplary 
officers. 253The court in its conclusion held that the dismissal was automatically unfair. The 
employees were unfairly discriminated against on the grounds of religion, culture and/or gender 
which led to the dismissals.254 
 
6.2. Department of Correctional Services and another v POPCRU and others 2013 4 SA 
176 (SCA) 
The matter then went on appeal with special leave to the SCA.  The court echoed what was 
decided in the Labour Appeal Court. The court held that no evidence was presented to prove 
that the employees’ hair which was worn for a long time until they were ordered to shave it, 
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diminished the performance of their work or made them susceptible to corruption. 255 The 
employers could not satisfy the court that short hair was an inherent requirement of their job.  
The court stated that “a policy is not justified if it restricts a practice of religious and cultural belief 
that does not affect an employee’s ability to perform his duties, nor jeopardize the safety of the public 
or other employees, nor cause undue hardship to the employer in a practical sense”. 256 In conclusion 
the court held that “no rational connection was established between the purpose of the discrimination 
and the measure taken”. The Appeal had to fail for these reasons.  
 
6.3. Kieviets Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others 2011 32 ILJ 923 (LC) 
The employee respondent was employed by the applicant as a chef. She requested permission 
from her employer to be granted a month’s unpaid leave to attend sangoma training. The 
employee presented a certificate by her traditional healer however her request was denied. 
When her employer refused to grant her leave she went on leave without the permission of her 
employer. She was then charged with several acts of misconduct and dismissed for being absent 
from work for more than 3 days without leave. 257 The employee’s supervisor indicated that 
the certificate the employee had submitted was from the North West Dingaka Association and 
was therefore not a valid certificate. 258 He further stated that had she produced a valid medical 
certificate, they would have granted her leave and would not have dismissed her.  
The Commissioner indicated that employees have a duty to render a service. Employees are 
expected to be at work during working hours unless their absence is warranted by a valid 
reason. 259 It was noted that the parties had conflicting and competing interests. However there 
was a lack of empathy in the applicant’s workplace.260 
The Commissioner stated that the issue was whether the employees’ absence was     
justifiable.261   The onus was on the employee to prove that her absence from work was 
necessitated by circumstances beyond her control. The main aspect of the judgment focused on 
the fact that the employee had feared that if she did not abide by the sangoma course, her life 
would be in danger or she would suffer a misfortune. 262  The Commissioner emphasized the 
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importance of life and that it ranked higher than anything else. Also that the Applicant would 
not have suffered irreparable harm as a result of the employees leave of absence. It was 
established that the employee’s absence was beyond her control. The commissioner held that 
the employees’ refusal to grant her unpaid leave was unreasonable and the dismissal was 
substantively unfair. A reinstatement of the employee with immediate effect was ordered by 
the Commissioner. The matter went on review which was also dismissed. 
6.4. Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi 2012 11 BLLR 1099 (LAC)   
The matter went on Appeal before the LAC. The court indicated that the focus was on “whether 
the result of the award falls within a range of reasonable results and not whether it was in fact the correct 
one. The question is whether there is justification for the decision on the material before the 
Commissioner”. 263 
The court indicated that the employers relied heavily on the fact that the employee claimed to 
be ill and that the traditional healers certificate was not a valid medical certificate. The 
employee never did aver that she was ill in the conventional sense but rather that she was 
experiencing something that required the help and assistance from a traditional healer. 264 
 
The court in its judgment stated “it would be disingenuous of anybody to deny that our society 
is characterized by a diversity of cultures, traditions and beliefs”.265 The court correctly pointed 
out that cultural and traditional diversity will inevitably create challenges and the workplace is 
no exception. 266 The court emphasized that there are those who subscribe to certain religious 
and cultural beliefs and consider them as strongly held beliefs. Furthermore, those who do not 
subscribe to them should in no way trivialize them. 267 
The court further emphasized the need for reasonable accommodation in order to ensure a 
society that is harmonious and unified. Tlaletsi, J A highlighted the need for accommodating 
one another. It was held that both employers and employees should develop solutions to these 
challenges.268 The court ultimately held that the decision reached is one that a reasonable 
decision maker would reach. 
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 6.5. Kievits Kroon Country Estate v. Mmoledi & Others 2014 1 SA 585 (SCA) 
The matter then went to the SCA where the appellants contended that the Commissioner carried 
out the incorrect inquiry as to whether the employee was justified in absenting herself from 
work furthermore the Commissioner taking judicial notice of certain concepts.269  
The Appellants indicated that the Commissioner should have considered whether it was fair 
for the employer not to grant the employee leave. The Appellants contended that the dismissal 
was substantively fair in that there was no provision in the employment contract for unpaid 
leave, the appellants were accommodating in allowing for one week’s unpaid leave and her 
request for such a lengthy period of leave was unreasonable given the operational requirements 
of the company. 270 The Appellants stated that the Commissioner made the incorrect inquiry: 
whether the respondents’ failure in reporting to work was justified. The correct enquiry was 
whether the principles pertaining to a request for unpaid leave was applied.271 The court in 
assessing the enquiry made reference to the POPCRU case in that the employees sincerely held 
beliefs were protected by the Constitution.272  
Crucially the court stated that when it comes to traditional medicine or culture and belief, the 
courts are unable and should not evaluate the “acceptability, logic, consistency or comprehensibility 
of the belief”. The courts should only take into consideration an employee’s sincerity of the 
belief. It should determine if it is a bona fide belief or whether there is some other ulterior 
motive for invoking the belief.273  
The court can order in favour of the employee if it is found that the employee’s failure to 
present herself at work without authorization from the employer or where the employer 
specifically denies leave of absence, if the leave of absence was justified or reasonable. The 
commissioner’s inquiry was whether the respondent’s failure to obey her employers order to 
report to work and the denial of leave of absence was justified.274  
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In addition, the court stated that the Appellants failed to understand the significance of the 
traditional healer’s certificate. Had they took the opportunity to understand its significance, 
they would probably have been more accommodating to the employee. 275 
The court ultimately dismissed the Appeal.  
 
6.6. Dlamini and others v Green Four Security 2006 11 BLLR 1074 (LC) 
The Applicant employees’ brought the matter before the Labour Court averring that they had 
been discriminated against on the basis of religion and that their dismissal was automatically 
unfair in terms of Section 187 (f) of the LRA. The Applicants couldn’t shave or trim their 
beards as they were a part of the Baptised Nazareth Group which forbid them from doing so. 
The applicants had to prove that “this was an essential tenet” of their faith and that they were 
dismissed for refusing to shave or trim their beards, 276 which was prescribed by a policy 
requiring employees to be clean-shaven.277 
The right not to be discriminated against is a crucial right as it gives effect to the Constitutional 
provision of fair labour practice. 278  
The court when analyzing the dispute adopted a conceptual framework. 
The first step in the enquiry when dealing with a claim for discrimination is whether the facts 
relied upon is proved? Secondly, if discrimination is proven, is it justified? The court must then 
consider whether the workplace rule is an inherent requirement of a job and therefore justified. 
If it cannot be justified then the enquiry ceases. The rule would not be considered as justified   
and would therefore be unlawful. Thirdly, even where the rule is an inherent requirement of 
the job, it may still be discriminatory in nature, if the employer had failed to reasonably 
accommodate the employee or did not modify the rule or allow the employee to be exempted 
from the rule. 279  
In the first step of the enquiry the employees bear the onus. The Applicants would have to 
prove that trimming their beards would be a violation of an essential part of their faith. 
Establishing this would prove that they were indirectly discriminated against. 280  The 
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Respondents did not question the applicant’s belief. They however did not agree that the 
Nazareth faith prohibited the trimming of hair or a beard. 
The applicants failed to prove that the rule is in existence or relevant today and furthermore 
that it is an essential tenant of the religion. 281 The court held that the Applicants were selective 
in the rules they followed.282 
The court highlighted the US approach. In the US, the courts apply a “strict scrutiny” test. This 
test requires that a rule denying a person’s freedom to practice their religion must serve a 
“compelling State interest”. The Constitutional Court rejected this test and favoured “a nuanced 
and context-sensitive” balance.283 The court highlighted that a balance has to be struck between 
the competing interests of the right to religious freedom commercial interests of an employer.  
This should be done in a way that is reasonable and rational.284 If these competing interests 
cannot be balanced and no accommodation is provided for, then the one has to prevail over the 
other.285 
The court indicated that “workplaces are typically home to diverse religions and the balance has to 
be struck sensitively. To balance freedom of religion against other rights and the interests of a diverse 
workforce, even-handedness is required, not subtle or explicit bias in favour one or other religion, or 
scrupulous secularism, or complete neutrality. (S v Lawrence para 122; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) 
SA 1176 (CC) para 122) However when the balance is struck, it cannot be to the detriment of the 
enterprise or other workers.”286 
 
It is an established rule that the “more serious the impact of the workplace rule on the freedom of 
religion, the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be”.287 A rule would be justified if 
it’s an inherent requirement of a job. 288 The employees did not dispute that neatness was an 
inherent requirement of a job however they disputed that having an untrimmed beard was 
untidy. The court had to therefore decide whether the untrimmed beard was neat or not. 289 
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SANDF, SAPS, Durban Metro Police issued standing orders relating to neatness and dress 
codes.290 In all three standing orders the standards of neatness were high. The court held that 
the Respondents rule was neither arbitrary no irrational.291  The court further held that had the 
Applicants practiced their religion strictly and not in such a flexible way, the effects of the rule 
would have been more serious. 292 The religious rule did not have a consequential penalty 
whereas the workplace rule did. When the courts balanced the one rule against the other the 
workplace rule had to prevail. The workplace rule was also an inherent requirement and was 
justified. 293 
The court held the applicants were not discriminated against and that their dismissal is 
accordingly not unfair. 
Throughout the case the court refers to foreign cases and how they have dealt with religious 
issues in the workplace.  
6.7. FAWU & Others v Rainbow Chicken Farms 2000 21 ILJ 615 (LC) 
The Applicants were employed by Rainbow Chickens Farms as butchers to slaughter chickens 
at their farm. It was an operational requirement that all butchers were Muslim so that halaal 
standards could be adhered to when the chickens were being slaughtered. 294 The operation of 
the farm was dependent on the slaughterers because without them there was no need for the 
additional 2000 workers who were employed to pack. 295  The issue of contention between 
employer and employees were that the employees did not want to work on the Muslim religious 
holiday Eid-ul-fitr and had in fact refused to do so. They were absent from work on the said 
day without the permission. 296 A collective agreement between the employer company and the 
union only entitled the workers to gazette public holidays and Eid- ul- fitr was one of them. 297 
The decisive issue was the fact that had the employer given the butchers off on the said date, 
then no work could have been done. The rest of the employees would have to take the day off 
even if they were not Muslim. 298 The butchers did not attend work on the said date which 
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resulted in a disciplinary hearing leading ultimately to their dismissals. 299 The employees then 
approached the Labour Court. They claimed their dismissals were automatically unfair in terms 
of 187 (1) (f) of the Labour Relations Act alternatively that their dismissals were substantively 
and procedurally unfair in terms of Section 188 of the Act. 300 It was decided that the employees 
were not discriminated against unfairly as all employees were required to work on Eid. 301 
The court held that dismissal was not the appropriate sanction. Looking holistically at the 
judgment ultimately the main point made by the court was that there was equality in treatment 
of the employees. However an important principle articulated was that where an employer 
allows only some employees to celebrate a religious holiday whereas others are not permitted, 
this may constitute unfair discrimination. It can be seen from the case that there would be a 
proviso attached to this in that it will not be unfair where the granting of permission has the 
result that no work can be done.302 The employer’s operational requirements took precedence 
over the employees’ religious day. The court barely touched on the issue of what 
accommodation is required of employers to employees who wish to express their faith. All that 
was stated was that the parties should endeavour to find a solution where no production is lost 
on Eid, and the butchers take the day off, at least on some Eid celebrations. 
 
6.8. Lewis v Media 24 Ltd 2010 31 ILJ 2416 (LC) 
The Applicant employee in this case claimed compensation for unfair discrimination in terms 
of section 50(2) (a) of the Employment Equity Act on grounds of religion, cultural and political 
beliefs.303 The Applicant claimed that the Respondent required him to comply with policies 
against his religion, thereby discriminating against him. He further stated that the employer 
harassed him and terminated his employment because he had taken issue with the policies and 
practices. 304 He also stated that his employer despite being aware that he belonged to the 
Jewish faith forced him to work on the Jewish Sabbath. The remedy sought by the Applicant 
was R100 000.00 compensation. 305 The court in this case largely relied on the evidence and 
testimony of the parties and witnesses.  
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The court highlighted that the essential elements to be proven when there is a contravention of 
section 6(1) are: 
1. “there must be discrimination – differential treatment based on a listed or analogous ground; 
2. the discrimination must be sourced in an employment policy or practice; 
3. it must be against an employee; and 
4. it must be unfair”306 
The court went further. It stated that “the concept of discrimination is made up of three issues: 
differential treatment; the listed grounds; and the reason for the treatment. Once a difference in 
treatment is based on a listed ground; the difference in treatment becomes discrimination for the 
purpose of Section 9 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the EEA. 307 
There must be a difference in treatment in which the employee is less favourably treated than others”. 
The Applicant based his claim on alleged differential treatment by the employer as follows: 
“harassment; the failure to accommodate his observance of Shabbat; and the termination of his 
employment”.308  
 
The court had to determine if the differential treatment was direct or indirect. Direct 
discrimination is where the employer treats the employee differently from others as a result 
prohibited ground309 Indirect discrimination is where a rule is imposed and on the face of it 
does not seem to differentiate between employees, however it has the effect of differentiating 
between employees. 310  The Applicant relied on religion, political opinion and culture as 
grounds for the discrimination.311 The third issue for determination by the court was whether 
the difference in treatment was based on the prohibited grounds. The Constitutional Court has 
established that differential treatment is “substantially based on one of the listed grounds”312 
The Applicant failed to establish a nexus between the listed grounds and differential 
treatment.313 
 
One of the main issues of contention in this case was the fact that the Applicant complained 
about working overtime and therefore on the religious Shabbat. 314 He was asked whether he 
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informed the employer that he was Jewish. He said that the employer “could not assume everyone 
was of the same faith” and had assumed that the employer was in fact aware that he was Jewish. 
Cheadle JA held that in this case it was common cause that the employer did not have a policy 
to accommodate religious minorities, but the court made it clear that even if it did have such 
policy it would only be applied if the employer was aware of the employees’ religious 
affiliation. 315  
The court highlighted that the critical issue in this case was not whether there existed a policy 
or practice but rather whether the employer was aware of the religious beliefs and practices and 
still expected him to work overtime. 316 By considering the evidence it was established that the 
employer had no knowledge that the Applicant was Jewish and therefore requiring him to work 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The right to practice ones’ religious and cultural beliefs is firmly entrenched in the Constitution 
and applies in the workplace through employment law. The right is not absolute and requires 
the weighing of rights in a constitutionally compliant manner. In weighing up competing rights, 
a certain level of understanding and respect by the employer is required. 317  
When analyzing the case law in respect of workplace religious discrimination, it is to be noted 
that the courts have not adopted a formal or universal test in dealing with such disputes. 
Adopting a universal test would have unfavorable effects and consequences on the developing 
jurisprudence as the test would be restrictive in nature. When adjudicating such disputes it is 
necessary for the courts to adopt a context-sensitive approach to each case. 318  
The courts should establish certain factors when adjudicating religious discrimination disputes 
as highlighted in the case law:  
 The courts should firstly establish that the dispute is employment based with reference 
to requirements of the employment relationship; 
 The parties to the dispute are to rely on national legislation and not directly on the 
Constitution; 
 The definition should be looked at in terms of the Convention 111; 
 When conducting an interpretation of  legislation, it must be done in a way that would 
advance the rights, values and principles of the Bill of Rights; 
 By avoiding the adoption a one-test-fits-all approach, this will ensure the development 
of jurisprudence in dealing with religious based disputes; 
 The more judicial analyses there are on issues of religious discrimination in the 
workplace, the greater this can influence the quantity and quality of jurisprudence. 319 
The case of SACTWU and others v Berg River Textiles, A division of Seardel Group Trading 
(Pty) Ltd320  is a noteworthy one as it seeks to set out guidelines that are comprehensive, thereby 
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having the effect of assisting courts in the future when dealing with religious discrimination 
disputes.  
 
The matter involved the dismissal of 36 employees for being absent from work without leave. 
The issue at hand was whether or not the dismissal was fair. A further issue to the case, which 
is relevant to this thesis is the issue of the second applicant, who averred that the primary reason 
for his dismissal was due to his refusal with work on Sundays. He therefore claimed that his 
dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of Section 187 (1) (f) of the LRA on the basis that 
he was discriminated against on the grounds of his religious beliefs. The focus will therefore 
be on the issues relating to the second respondent and how the issue was decided. 321 
Berg River Textiles sought to implement a new shift system resulting in the second applicant’s 
issue of contention which was that the new shift system required him to work on Sundays 
which was contrary to his religious beliefs. 322 The members were given written warnings that 
the stoppages engaged in constituted an unprotected strike323 The second applicant when asked 
to report to duty one Sunday, refused to do so. 324 Disciplinary enquiries were held and all other 
members pleaded guilty except for the second applicant who pleaded not guilty as his religion 
prohibited him from working on Sundays and this was the reason for his failure to report to 
work. He was found guilty and dismissed. 325 
This case is important in that it succinctly sets out the principles and requirements for a claim 
based on religious discrimination particularly in a workplace environment and can therefore be 
relied upon in other matters of this nature. In relying on the Labour Appeal Judgment in the 
POPCRU case, the court set out as follows:  
1. A workplace rule or policy that appears to be neutral and which is applied uniformly to 
all employees may be discriminatory if it goes against an individual employees’ 
religious beliefs. This approach contrary to what was expressed in the FAWU case326 
where the judge held “that there be some form of differentiation between employees” for a 
rule or policy to be discriminatory.  
                                                          
321 Ibid 1.  
322 Ibid 9. 
323 Ibid 10. 
324 Ibid 11-20. 
325 Ibid 23. 
326 FAWU supra note 294 at 12-13. 
56 
  
2.  It is “incumbent on the [employees] to show that the [employer] through their enforcement of 
the prohibition …interfered with their participation in or practice of their religion or culture”.  
 
3. The religious belief or principle claimed by the employee must be a central tenet of that 
religion.  
 
4. An employee is not required to assert their religious convictions to an employee. 
However an employer must be aware of the employees’ religious belief or practice in 
order for a claim of religious discrimination to succeed. 
 
5. Where religious discrimination exists as demonstrated by the employee, the onus is on 
the employer to prove that the rule was either an inherent requirement of the job or 
that the discrimination was fair.  
 
6. In addition the employer has to demonstrate that it reasonably accommodated the 
employee in respect of his or her religious convictions.  The proportionality test must 
apply and if there is none or little consequence to the business, if the rule is not 
complied with by the employee, then the employee should be exempted from having 
to comply with the rule.  
 
7. Intention of the employer is irrelevant to the enquiry. 327 
 
The second applicant testified vehemently that the prohibition to work on Sundays was a 
central tenet to his religion as a Christian and that those beliefs were of utmost importance to 
him.328  The court importantly stated that despite the fact that the workplace rule applied 
uniformly to everyone without any differentiation between the employees, “the test is whether 
workplace rule discriminated against the beliefs of any single employee irrespective of how neutral it 
was”. 329 The Respondents were always aware that the prohibition to work on Sundays was a 
central tenet to the second applicant’s religion. The second applicants had turned down 
promotions and overtime work so that he would not have to work on Sundays. 330 
The second applicant established a case of discrimination on the basis of his religious beliefs.  
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The Respondent claimed the rule was an inherent requirement of the job and that it had no 
means of accommodating the second respondent. The court held that against the clear 
guidelines formulated in the POPCRU case the failure to accommodate the employee by 
removing his obligation to work on Sundays rendered the dismissal automatically and 
substantively unfair. The Respondents were ordered to reinstate the employee.    
A trend has emerged from analysis of case law. In order for a claim of unfair dismissal to 
succeed, the employee will be required to establish a sincerely held belief.331 In terms of the 
Pillay case, an employer should take positive measures to reasonably accommodate an 
employees’ religious practice however they are not required to incur unnecessary or undue 
hardship. 332 
The employer will have to establish that the discrimination was fair. Alternatively that the rule 
or practice was an inherent requirement of a job. 333 With the evolvement of society there is a 
need for employers to accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs. 334  Ultimately, the 
fundamental subjective nature of religion demands “meaningful engagement” between employer 
and employee to accommodate differences thus ensuring the right to fair labour practices. 335  
South African labour law has a long way to go in dealing with disputes of this nature. Despite 
the development and evolvement of this country, diversity will more often than not result in 
disputes in the context of employment law. It is therefore necessary for such diversity to be 
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